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Abstract—Reactive power compensation is an important challenge
in current and future smart power systems. However, in the context
of reactive power compensation, most existing studies assume that
customers can assess their compensation value, i.e., Var unit,
objectively. In this paper, customers are assumed to make decisions
that pertain to reactive power coordination. In consequence, the
way in which those customers evaluate the compensation value
resulting from their individual decisions will impact the overall grid
performance. In particular, a behavioral framework, based on the
framing effect of prospect theory (PT), is developed to study the effect
of both objective value and subjective evaluation in a reactive power
compensation game. For example, such effect allows customers to
optimize a subjective value of their utility which essentially frames
the objective utility with respect to a reference point. This game
enables customers to coordinate the use of their electrical devices
to compensate reactive power. For the proposed game, both the
objective case using expected utility theory (EUT) and the PT
consideration are solved via a learning algorithm that converges
to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, several key
properties of this game are derived analytically. Simulation results
show that, under PT, customers are likely to make decisions that
differ from those predicted by classical models. For instance, using
an illustrative two-customer case, we show that a PT customer will
increase the conservative strategy (achieving a high power factor)
by 29% compared to a conventional customer. Similar insights are
also observed for a case with three customers.
Index Terms—Smart grid, game theory, prospect theory, framing
effect, reactive power compensation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reactive power compensation, commonly known as Var com-
pensation, aims to improve the efficiency of delivering energy
in power systems by reducing transmission losses. This has led
to much research that investigates how to control and manage
reactive power in a smart grid [1]. Delivering energy over power
lines will generate active and reactive power, and a suitable
reactive power compensation can decrease energy losses and
increase the power factor which is defined as the value of the
tangent of the angle between active and reactive power [2].
However, due to the aging of the devices (i.e., motors, switches)
and the varying energy requirements from end-nodes, smart grid
customers may obtain different power factors depending on the
same devices that they are previously and currently using. In
particular, in the smart grid, the power company can require
customers to achieve a given power factor for efficient delivery
of AC power [3]. Recent studies on reactive power compensation
have focused on analyzing coordination mechanisms, in which
some customers can support extra reactive power on behalf of
others, as discussed in [4]–[6].
Reactive power compensation in the smart grid has been
investigated in [7]–[10]. In particular, reactive power coordination
between customers in a local area has been technically introduced
at the hardware level, using voltage-source-converter technologies
that can both absorb and supply reactive power, as discussed
in [11]–[13]. To further explore the coordination between cus-
tomers, the authors in [7] proposed an active-reactive power
dispatch procedure to minimize opportunity costs via the use of
marginal pricing mechanisms to compensate generators for power
provision. The work in [8] developed a Pareto-optimization based
zonal reactive power market model and a hybrid evolutionary
approach was applied in a competitive electricity market. In [9],
the authors studied the asynchronous generator system in a wind
farm so as to efficiently improve Var compensation between
different operating moments of asynchronous generators. The
authors in [10] allowed the customer to bid reactive power in the
energy market as well as maintain the voltage stability margin
in an IEEE 39 bus test system. Other related approaches for
compensating reactive power are discussed in [14]–[17].
The works in [7]–[10], [14]–[17] study reactive power compen-
sation using mathematical tools, such as optimization and game
theory. However, most of these existing works assume that cus-
tomers, as the compensating nodes in the grid, can objectively and
precisely assess their power factor compensation, i.e., Var value.
However, in practice, customers may have subjective perceptions
on how they view such Var values as well as on how other cus-
tomers compensate reactive power. For example, operating induc-
tive equipment (i.e., motor, relay, speaker, solenoid, transformer
and lamp ballast, or even the operation of switched capacitor)
will change the tangent relationship between active power and
reactive power and then change the transmission losses. This
tangent value, or power factor, will impact the active power which,
in turn, impacts a customer’s electricity bill. To properly study
such reactive power compensation one must therefore account
for different customers perceptions on the economic gains and
losses associated with their bills, which is directly dependent
on the active power. In particular, other considerations involve
the customers’ opinion on the usage of electricity, the reduction
of transmission losses, the economic payoffs and the effect
of electricity operation and requirement. Thus, when designing
power factor compensation and coordination mechanisms, one
must take into account such customer-related human factors.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new game-
theoretic framework to understand how customers can coordinate
their reactive power compensations while taking into account
their individual subjective perceptions on the economic gains
and losses associated with this coordination. We formulate the
compensation problem as a static noncooperative game, in which
a customer can decide whether or not to act in concert with others,
based on reactive power technologies (i.e., install capacitor and
voltage support), when their inductive loads change (such as using
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbols Description
p active power
q reactive power
s apparent power
φ initial power factor (without any compensation)
φ˜ power factor required by grid
qc a customer’s compensating Var value
q˜c a customer’s compensating Var value required by grid
i a customer’s index
N the total number of customers
qci (ai) customer i’s Var value using action ai
ai customer i’s (pure) action/strategy
σi customer i’s mixed strategy
ui the utility of customer i’s pure strategy
u0i the utility reference point of customer i’s pure strategy
Ui customer i’s expected utility
UEUTi customer i’s expected utility under EUT
UPTi customer i’s expected utility under PT
τ a penalty factor in Var exchange
α weighting factors to capture gain distortions
β weighting factors to capture loss distortions
k aversion parameter to tune losses and gains
m the number of iterations
speakers, cables or motors in a community). In this game, each
customer aims to optimize a Var utility that captures the benefits
of reaching a high power factor and the associated costs needed
to provide reactive power. We allow customers to subjectively
evaluate their objective utility which implies that customers can
have different ways to measure the economic benefits that they
reap from the power compensation game [18]–[21]. Compared
to related works on smart grids [7]–[17], the contributions of
this paper include: 1) in contrast to conventional game utility,
we allow customers to subjectively evaluate their compensation
of Var gains and losses and then explore the probability of
achieving this compensation; 2) we design a Var coordination
mechanism that encourages customers to efficiently utilize the
existing compensating devices and to reach an acceptable power
factor required by the grid; and 3) we develop a distributed
algorithm, fictitious play (FP), that is proven to converge to a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, thus characterizing
the solution under classical game theory and PT. In simulations,
our studies show that insightful difference between classical
and PT evaluations makes customers change the frequency with
which they participate in reactive power compensation, in terms
of achieving power factors. Our results also show that zonal
compensation can be coordinated via the customers’ perception
of their Var gains as opposed to their Var losses, which can
reduce the overall amount of data collected during reactive power
compensation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model and formulates the reactive power
compensation as a noncooperative game. In Section III, we
introduce a novel behavioral framework with PT considerations
and in Section IV we use FP to solve the game. Simulation results
are presented in Section V while conclusions are drawn in Section
VI.
II. REACTIVE POWER COMPENSATION MODEL AND GAME
FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the reactive power compen-
sation model and then, formulate a noncooperative game between
the customers. The main notations are listed in Table I.
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of reactive power compensation.
A. Reactive Power Compensation Model
Consider a smart grid in which each customer has a variable
reactive power compensation that depends on each customer’s
owned equipment [1] and [2]. Let N be the set of all N cus-
tomers. In general, for reactive power compensation, a customer
can install a capacitor or a voltage/current source to reduce
the power losses and improve voltage regulation at the load
terminals [1]. The power company measures the active power
and gives customers their optimized power factor (PF). However,
existing Var compensation technologies, i.e., using a capacitor,
cannot always guarantee reaching a fixed power factor, due to
the varying inductive requirement and dynamical operation, i.e.,
capacitor switching time. Here, we assume that a customer i ∈ N
requires active power pi ∈ P and causes reactive power qi ∈ Q,
and thus, its apparent power si ∈ S is s2i = p2i+q2i and its current
PF is φi ∈ Φ. Each customer will compensate the reactive power
and increase its PF to a predefined PF φ˜i ∈ Φ˜, as announced by
the power company.
In general, the power factor relates to a phase angle and
is defined by the ratio of active power (or real power) p and
apparent power s as shown in Fig. 1. q and q˜ are, respectively, the
actual reactive power and the required reactive power. Then, after
reactive power compensation, customer i’s actual compensation
is qci . Here, we note that the power company will set a desired,
compensation requirement/standard. In this regard, we use q˜ci to
denote this required/standard reactive power compensation for
each customer. Due to the delivery of AC power, there exists
a capacitor between the power line and ground. In order to
effectively deliver the active power and economical consideration,
the power company requires customers to reduce their reactive
power from q to q˜ via a predefined PF. In practice, it is hard
to directly measure the PF because of the phase angle between
voltage and current. Instead, the company can collect the energy
usage of active and apparent power, and, then, send to the
customers the tangent value of the angle between active and
apparent power, i.e., PF. Hence, we assume that a customer
will require a constant active power and varying reactive power,
such that its PF can be easily received in the process of Var
compensation [2]. From Fig. 1, we can compute the required
Var compensation, i.e., customer i’s required compensation q˜ci ,
as follows:
q˜ci (φi, φ˜i) = pi · tan θi − pi · tan θ˜i,
= pi ·
√
1− φ2i
φi
− pi ·
√
1− φ˜2i
φ˜i
,
(1)
where φi = cos θi and φ˜i = cos θ˜i In practice, it is hard to install
new equipment for compensation and the customers can obtain
a varying PF due to their over/under compensation. Thus, there
might be a need for a Var coordination between customers so as
to achieve optimal local compensation. In the studied scenario,
it is necessary to devise a mechanism used to understand how
the customers compensate reactive power, and how their usage
of inductive loads impacts the overall system, in terms of Var
benefits and costs. For example, a customer can have some in-
ductive loads, such as speakers in an event or motors for pumping
water and, thus, its reactive power requirement increases, as its PF
decreases. In such a case, it is difficult to install new capacitors;
instead, compensating reactive power from other nodes will be an
efficient way to maintain the PF requirement. For example, some
customers such as electrical vehicles and reactive power plants,
can discharge power to increase PF for the total Var compensation∑
i∈N q˜
c
i . Here, we assume that each customer can obtain/reach
a PF via the existing compensating equipment. In this respect,
customers will have different power requirements and can achieve
a varying PF. Thus, the decisions made by customers will depend
on such PF as the operation of the existing devices changes,
even if they install new compensating devices. Next, we mainly
study the competitive coordination between customers, using their
reached PFs, which leads to a game-theoretic setting as discussed
next.
B. Noncooperative Game Formulation
We analyze the operations of compensating reactive power
between customers using noncooperative game theory [22]. As
previous discussed, the customers compensate reactive power
based on their existing equipment. Then, they must make a
decision on whether to sell (buy) reactive power to (from) the
grid. For the studied model, the compensation value is the reactive
power difference between initial PF and the compensated PF
reached by customers. For example, the power company allows
some customers to buy reactive power from those supplying extra
Var compensation, as total Var compensation is satisfied [23]–
[25]. Thus, customer i can compensate reactive power qci and
reach its PF φci , while the power company announces the standard
PF φ˜i.
When coordinating reactive power compensation, customers
can interdependently determine how much reactive power must be
compensated (i.e., Var). We can formulate a static noncooperative
game in strategic form Ξ = [N , {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ], that is
characterized by three main elements: 1) the players which are
the customers in the set N , 2) the strategy or action Ai := (φi, 1],
which represents customer i’s achieved PF, and 3) the utility
function ui of any player i ∈ N , which captures the benefit-
cost tradeoffs associated with the different choices. In particular,
we hereinafter assume a discrete strategy set. The value of the
utility function achieved by a customer i that chooses an action
ai is given by:
ui(ai,a−i) = Bi(ai,a−i)− Ci(ai,a−i), (2)
where a−i = [a1, a2, . . . , ai−1, . . . , ai+1, . . . , aN ] is the vector of
actions of all players other than i, Bi(ai,a−i) is the Var benefits
customer i obtained if it provides surplus Var to the grid, and
Ci(ai,a−i) is the cost in Var coordination. In practice, customer
i’s action ai corresponds to deciding on whether to sell or buy
reactive power. Then, compared to the required Var compensation
q˜c in (1), customer i will compensate reactive power as follows:
qci (ai) = q
c
i (φi, ai) = pi ·
√
1− φ2i
φi
− pi ·
√
1− a2i
ai
.
Here, before we study the benefits and costs using reactive power,
we first design a Var coordination exchange between customers:
Ei(ai,a−i) = qci (ai)−
∑
j∈N q
c
j(aj)
N
. (3)
In particular, Ei(·) is the Var difference between customer i
and the average compensation. In (3), customer i’s compensating
quantity qci depends on its action ai, i.e., qci (ai) as the customers’
interactions are captured through qci . Due to the fact that the total
Var compensation
∑
i∈N q
c
i (ai) is affected by other customers,
Ei(·) can have a negative value even if customer i’s Var compen-
sation exceeds its standard, i.e., ai > φ˜i. Using (3), the benefit
of Var exchange will be:
B(ai,a−i) =


Ei(ai,a−i) if ai ≥ φ˜i and
∑
i∈N
qci ≥
∑
i∈N
q˜ci ,
0 otherwise.
(4)
Moreover, the cost incurred by customer i is
C(ai,a−i) =


τi(q
c
i − q˜ci )+ if ai ≥ φ˜i and
∑
i∈N
qci ≥
∑
i∈N
q˜ci ,
−Ei(ai,a−i) if ai < φ˜i and
∑
i∈N
qci ≥
∑
i∈N
q˜ci ,
qci otherwise,
(5)
where (F )+ = max{0, F} and 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1 is a penalty factor
that weighs the losses of customer i when its Var compensation
is greater than the standard compensation q˜ci .
The utility function in (2) captures both the Var benefit as well
as the associated costs of having a high PF. Here, when a customer
i requires large reactive power and decreases its PF, i.e., qci < q˜ci
or ai < φ˜i, its benefit in (4) is zero and its utility is Ei(ai,a−i),
while total compensation satisfies power system requirement. In
particular, its utility depends on the reactive power coordination,
and its Var payment would be given to those who provide extra
reactive power compensation. On the other hand, if a customer
has a high PF, i.e., ai > φ˜i and provides extra reactive power, it
might obtain a benefit due to (3). By using a high PF, such as by
over compensating the PF to 0.95, one might increase the system
voltage [2] and then cause voltage oscillation in the grid. Such
an extreme high voltage resulting from the overcompensation
will endangers the usage of equipment. Thus, a penalty in (5)
limits the extreme case, if all users pursue high PFs. Without loss
generality, we also consider another case upon which the total
reactive power compensated by all customers cannot meet the
total Var requirement, i.e.,
∑
i∈N
q˜ci , and assume that all customers
lose their Var values in compensation.
III. PROSPECT THEORY FOR REACTIVE POWER
COMPENSATION
In this section, we first study a conventional game solution
using expected utility theory to understand how the reactive
power compensation game can reach an equilibrium. Then, using
prospect theory, we analyze the impact of customer behavior on
this game, when customers frame their utility values with respect
to a reference point.
A. Reactive Power Compensation under Expected Utility Theory
Owing to the varying active/reactive power requirement (i.e.,
charging/discharging, voltage support, and inductive load usage),
the PF reached by a customer is not a fixed constant. Also, due
to the continuous operation time for the compensation equipment
(i.e., switching diodes), the PFs reached after customer compen-
sations are not discrete values but continuous. However, the PF
announced by the power company falls within a discrete sample
space whose distribution can be specified by a probability mass
function. Here, we assume that customers can make probabilistic
choices over their discrete strategies and therefore, we are inter-
ested in studying the game under mixed strategies [22] rather
than under pure, deterministic strategies. Intuitively, a mixed
strategy is a probabilistic choice that captures how frequently
a customer will choose a given pure strategy. Such assumption
of the mixed, probabilistic choices is motivated by the following
factors: 1) a probability or frequency can represent how often a
customer reaches a power factor, and one can better understand
how such operations will occur over a large period of time, and
2) a customer would avoid providing individual power factor
compensation information so as to compete with its opponents.
In this respect, let σ = [σ1, σ2, . . . , σN ] be the vector of all
mixed strategies. For customer i, its σi(ai) ∈ Γi is the probability
corresponding to its pure strategy ai ∈ Ai, where Γi is the set of
mixed strategy available to customer i.
In traditional game theory [22], it is assumed that a player
makes rational decisions. Such rational decisions/actions imply
that, each player will objectively choose its mixed strategy vector
so as to optimize its own utility. Indeed, under the conventional
expected utility theory, the utility of each customer is simply the
expected value over its mixed strategies and thus, for any player
i ∈ N , its EUT utility is given by:
UEUTi (σ) =
∑
a∈A
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
ui(ai,a−i), (6)
where a is a vector of all chosen/played pure strategies and A =
A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN .
B. Reactive Power Compensation under Prospect Theory
Using the game-theoretic formulation in (6), a player can assess
its expected utility, where customers can objectively evaluate Var
payoff under EUT. However, because each customer evaluates its
economic benefits differently, such a subjective perception will
impact the overall results of the reactive power compensation
game. For example, for a 1 kW house usage, the compensation
of 100 Var may be considered by a customer (i.e., require Var
from grid), while such 100 Var might not enable a factory with
100 kW power requirement to buy Var from grid, due to the small
impact on PF. Indeed, due to the different viewpoints on a same
Var value, i.e., 100 Var, a small power customer will prefer to
compensate reactive power, while a large power customer might
ignore a strategy that small customers choose in compensation.
Thus, customers can make subjective evaluations that result in
a deviation from the utility in (2). A customer’s evaluation can
consist of both gains and losses, when it admits a criterion. In
particular, the gain (loss) is a positive (negative) value in (2),
as the criterion is 0 for EUT. Therefore, the difference between
the subjective evaluation and classical, objective utility in (2)
requires one to develop a new framework that can analyze the
compensation problem in a smart grid.
To study the customer’s behavior, several empirical stud-
ies [18], [26]–[28] have analyzed how customer behavior affects a
noncooperative game. In a decision-making process, a player can
evaluate its utility based on a reference, which represents how
this player measures gains and losses with respect to a certain
economic reference or framing point (e.g., a level of “wealth”). To
capture how losses loom larger than gains under the perception of
customers, one can map/transform the objective utility functions
into subjective value functions and, this transformation is the so-
called framing effect. In particular, when a customer makes a
decision, it will subjectively evaluate its utility, i.e., based on
its perception on the Var units of reactive power compensation.
Then, over-compensation and under-compensation might lead to
specific operational gains or losses. How such gains and losses are
evaluated will be given as a new different, customer-dependent
utility, i.e., uPTi . Thus, taking into account a reference point
and how benefits and costs are evaluated by each customer, the
expression of the utility will be different from that of EUT in (2).
In order to capture the effect of such evaluation, we will use
prospect theory [18]. In particular, prospect theory allows framing
the utilities based on the following criteria: 1) Reference point: a
player can evaluate its utility using its own individual reference
point and such evaluation represents how players act differently
via a possibly similar utility value (i.e., a same $100 can be
evaluated differently by a rich individual compared to a poor
individual); 2) Gain/loss aversion: a player has different attitudes
for given a value when it corresponds to a gain as opposed to
when it corresponds to a loss; and 3) Diminishing sensitivity:
a player is risk averse in large gain values and risk seeking in
small losses. Using these three notions, for each player i ∈ N , we
can review the utility function in (2) and construct a behavioral
utility function that can allow the players to evaluate both gains
and losses, with the realistic consideration of a utility reference
point [20]:
uPTi (a) =


(
ui(a)− u0i (a0)
)αi
if ui(a) ≥ u0i (a0),
−ki
(
u0i (a
0)− ui(a)
)βi
otherwise,
(7)
where u0i (a0) = ui(a0) is the utility reference point based on
the strategy vector a0, the weighting factors αi, βi ∈ (0, 1]
respectively capture the gain and loss distortions, and ki > 0 is an
aversion parameter to tune the impact difference between losses
and gains. In this respect, the utility in (7) is a desired S-shape
function and it is concave for gains and convex for losses [19].
Based on the reference point, smaller αi, βi will cause a greater
distortion in gain and loss magnitudes. Moreover, when ki > 1,
player i evaluation will have a stronger impact on its loss than its
gain, termed as the case “loss aversion” [29]. Compared to the
EUT utility function in (6), the expected utility under PT framing
is:
UPTi (σ) =
∑
a∈A
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i), (8)
where a is the choosing action vector, as mentioned in (6), and
uPTi is the PT pure utility of the action combination.
IV. GAME SOLUTION AND PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Next, we first show the existence of a mixed NE for the
proposed game and then, we prove that using an FP-based
algorithm customers can reach a mixed NE in our model.
In (6) or (8), we show the expected utility using the set of
mixed strategy over the action set Ai of each player i. The game-
theoretic solution for both EUT and PT can be characterized by
the concept of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium:
Definition 1: A mixed strategy profile σ∗ is said to be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium if, for each player i ∈ N , we have:
Ui(σ
∗
i ,σ
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(σi,σ∗−i), ∀σi ∈ Γi. (9)
Note that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium defined in (9) is
applicable for both EUT and PT; the difference would be in
whether one is using (6) or (8), respectively.
Lemma 1: For the proposed reactive power compensation
game, there exists at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
for PT.
Proof: In the proposed game, a player will assess the
objective utility and follow an EUT strategy using (2) and (6),
while it makes a PT-based decision in (8) via estimating the
subjective tradeoffs in (7). Under EUT, it has been shown that
there exists at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a
game with a finite number of players, in which each player can
choose from finitely many pure strategies. Under PT, both the
number of players and the number of their pure strategies do
not change. Then, for each pure strategy, the PT utility only
reconstructs underlying EUT value; therefore, there exists at least
one mixed NE in the PT game, as well as its existence in EUT.
Corollary 1: If no customer reaches the predefined PF in the
reactive power compensation game, i.e., ai < φ˜i, ∀i ∈ N , there
exists a unique, pure Nash equilibrium for both EUT and PT.
Proof: In this case, the total reactive power compensated by
all customers does not meet the total compensation requirement
using (2), (3), (4) and (5). In particular, ui = −qci (ai) for all
customers. For EUT, we have
∂ui
∂ai
=
∂ui
∂qci (ai)
· ∂q
c
i (ai)
∂ai
=− pi · 1√
1− a2i · a2i
< 0,
(10)
where φi < ai < φ˜i. Thus, player i will follow a dominant
strategy1, i.e., amini . Then all EUT customers will choose their
dominant strategies as a unique, pure NE. Similarly, for PT
∂uPTi
∂ai
=


−αipi · 1√
1−a2
i
·a2
i
· (ui(a)− u00(a0))αi−1
if ui(a) ≥ u0i (a0),
−kiβipi · 1√
1−a2
i
·a2
i
· (u00(a0)− ui(a))βi−1
otherwise.
(11)
Here, both (ui(a)− u00(a0))αi−1 and (u00(a0)− ui(a))βi−1 are
greater than 0. Hence, ∂u
PT
i
∂ai
< 0 and all PT customers will choose
the dominant strategy as a unique, pure NE strategy. In particular,
the unique, pure strategy is to choose the minimum PF strategy,
i.e., amini , in the strategy set.
1A strategy is said to be a dominant strategy for a player if it yields the best
utility (for that player) no matter what strategies the other players choose.
Corollary 2: If all customers exceed the predefined PF in the
reactive power compensation game, i.e., ai > φ˜i, ∀i ∈ N , and the
penalty factor will not be equal to the ratio of all customers minus
one (i.e., without customer i) to the total number of customers,
i.e., τi 6= N−1N , ∀i, there exists a unique, pure Nash equilibrium
for both EUT and PT.
Proof: In this case, the utility of player i is:
ui =q
c
i (ai)−
∑
i∈N q
c
i (ai)
N
− τi
(
qci (ai)− q˜ci (φ˜i)
)
=(
N − 1
N
− τi)qci (ai)−
∑
l 6=i,l∈N q
c
l (al)
N
+ τiq˜
c
i (φ˜i)
(12)
Under both EUT and PT, the utility derivatives on player i’s
strategy are given by:
∂ui
∂ai
=(
N − 1
N
− τi) · pi · 1√
1− a2i · a2i
,
∂uPTi
∂ai
=


(N−1
N
− τi) · αipi · 1√
1−a2
i
·a2
i
· (ui(a)− u00(a0))αi−1
if ui(a) ≥ u0i (a0),
(N−1
N
− τi) · kiβipi · 1√
1−a2
i
·a2
i
· (u00(a0)− ui(a))βi−1
otherwise.
(13)
Thus, as τi 6= N−1N , both EUT and PT utilities are monotonic
function on ai, and all players will choose their dominant strate-
gies as a unique, pure NE. In particular, 1) when τi < N−1N , the
NE is the maximum PF strategy set, 2) when τi > N−1N , the NE
is the minimum PF strategy set, 3) when τi = N−1N , the mixed
NEs are not unique.
The ratio N−1
N
is a value that depends only on the number
of customers. It captures how the extra compensation of one
customer will be shared by the others. Indeed, based on various
conditions related to τ , Corollary 2 shows a specific case in which
customers choose the same NE under both EUT and PT.
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 mainly provide the analysis when
the total customers’ compensation is strictly less/greater than the
total standard compensation. Next, we will study a two-customer
case, when one does not satisfy its compensation requirement and
exactly requires compensation from the other one.
Corollary 3: For a two-customer reactive power compensation
game, if both customers require different power and exceed the
predefined PF φ˜1 = φ˜2 = φ˜ using a pair of actions, i.e., Ai =
{v1, v2} (v1 < v2), v1+v22 = φ˜, then, there exists a unique, mixed
Nash equilibrium for both EUT and PT.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that p1 < p2
in the following proof. When the players exceed the predefined
PF using a pair of actions (v1, v2), the total compensation must
satisfy
qc1(v1) + q
c
2(v2) > q
c
1(φ˜) + q
c
2(φ˜). (14)
To derive this equation, we have
p1V (v1) + p2V (v2) < p1V (φ˜) + p2V (φ˜), (15)
where V (x) =
√
1−x2
x
. For another action combination (v2, v1),
we need to compare qc1(v2) + qc2(v1) and qc1(φ˜) + qc2(φ˜). In
particular, qc1(v2) + qc2(v1) − qc1(φ˜) − qc2(φ˜) = (p1 + p2)V (φ˜) −
p1V (v2)−p2V (v1). Since V (x) is decreasing and convex in [0, 1],
we have
p1V (v2)
p1 + p2
+
p2V (v1)
p1 + p2
≥V
(
p1
p1 + p2
v2 +
p2
p1 + p2
v1
)
=V
(
φ˜+
p1 − p2
2(p1 + p2)
(v2 − v1)
)
>V (φ˜).
(16)
Thus, qc1(v2) + qc2(v1) < qc1(φ˜) + qc2(φ˜). This inequality implies
that, ui(v2, v1) = −qci (ai) for both customers and thus, they will
lose their reactive power using a pair of actions (v2, v1).
Reactive power compensation: (Customer 1, Customer 2)
Player 2’s v1 Player 2’s v2
Player 1’s v1 u1(v1, v1), u2(v1, v1) u1(v1, v2), u2(v1, v2)
Player 1’s v2 u1(v2, v1), u2(v2, v1) u1(v2, v2), u2(v2, v2)
The above table is the utility of the proposed noncooperative
matrix game. To compare the utility values in the matrix game,
we must first define the notion of best response:
Definition 2: The best response br(a−i) of any storage unit
i ∈ N to the vector of strategies a−i is a set of strategies for
seller i such that:
br(a−i)={ai ∈ Ai|Ui(ai,a−i) ≥ Ui(a′i,a−i), ∀a′i ∈ Ai}.
Using the concept of best response, for any customer i ∈ N ,
when the other customers’ strategies are chosen as given by a−i,
any best response strategy in br(a−i) is at least as good as any
other strategy in Ai. Under EUT, since u1(v1, v1) > u1(v2, v1),
customer 1 will pick the action v1 as customer 2 chooses v1; for
customer 2, since u2(v1, v2) > u2(v1, v1), it will pick the action
v2 as customer 1 chooses v1. Under PT, because the framing
utility in (7) only changes the absolute difference between PT
(pure) utility and EUT (pure) utility, a PT customer does not
change its picking strategy as its opponent holds. Thus, there
exists a unique, mixed NE under both EUT and PT.
In particular, for EUT, as τ varies, the proposed game can
have three cases: 1) when τ is small, we can obtain u1(v2, v2) >
u1(v1, v2) and u2(v2, v2) > u2(v2, v1), thus, there is a unique,
pure NE (v2, v2); 2) when τ is large, we can obtain u1(v2, v2) <
u1(v1, v2), thus, there is a unique, pure NE (v1, v2); and 3) when
τ is a median value, we can obtain u1(v2, v2) > u1(v1, v2) and
u2(v2, v2) < u2(v2, v1), thus, there is a unique, proper mixed
NE. For PT, we will have the same conclusion due to the framing
utility uPTi in (7).
In a practical system, we have the following scenarios: 1) when
τ is small, the cost/penalty of providing reactive power to the
grid is small and, thus, both customers will seek to compensate
reactive power. 2) When τ is large, the cost/penalty of providing
reactive power is large. However, if the total compensation cannot
satisfy the Var requirements (both customers choose a small PF
strategy), the customers’ compensation action will be penalized.
Thus, these two customers will then compensate with each other
so as to avoid such a cost/penalty. 3) When τ is neither too large
nor too small, the cost/penalty might be equal to the compensation
of choosing the small PF strategy. Thus, customers will have a
mixed strategy.
To complete such compensation between two customers, as
per Corollary 3, the grid operator can announce the PFs and
based on wireless technologies, two customers will obtain the PF
information. Furthermore, to extend the two-by-two interactions
TABLE II
REACTIVE POWER COMPENSATION USING PROPOSED FP
Stage 1 - Initialization
Customer i chooses a certain initial mixed strategy vector σinit
i
.
Compute the standard and current compensation of customer i, i.e.,
Var value, using φi, φ˜i, pi,ai, (1)-(5).
Stage 2 - Equilibrium Learning for both EUT and PT,
repeat,
Each player i ∈ N observes the actions of its opponent at time
(m − 1):
a
−i(m − 1);
Compute all expected utilities of each pure strategy, (6)-(8), (18):
UEUT
i
(σ), UPT
i
(σ), ai(m);
Each player i ∈ N takes/chooses action ai(m) as per (18):
ai(m) = argmaxui
(
ai,σ−i(m− 1)
)
;
At time m, player i’s probability/frequency vector will be changed
as per (17), corresponding to player i’s pure actions ai:
σ
ai
i
(m) = m−1
m
· σai
i
(m− 1) + 1
m
· 1, ai ∈ Ai;
until
convergence to a stopping criterion for mixed-strategy NE:
|σi(m− 1)− σi(m)| < 0.0001.
Stage 3 - Var coordination between customers
Customers compensate their reactive power based on the power
factor. In a local area, customers will exchange reactive power which
will allow them to compensate their PFs.
to a general case, we can divide the area of interest into several
areas where two neighbors can have a peer-to-peer compensation.
For example, consider a scenario with 5 customers in two areas
participate in reactive power compensation. In particular, Area
A involves Customer A1, A2 and A3 while Area B involves
Customer B1 and B2. In particular, PA1 = 70, φA1 = 0.81, PA2 =
30, φA2 = 0.87, PA3 = 40, φA3 = 0.84 and PB1 = 43, φB1 = 0.86,
PB2 = 43, φB2 = 0.88. Then, the power factors in both areas
can be obtained by integrating the customers’ active powers and
factors in each area, i.e., φA = 0.83 and φB = 0.87. Then, these
two areas have a pair of power factors (actions). Thus, for the
power company, the customers can be first divided into two areas
using a pair of power factor (even if the number of customers in
each area is different).
To solve the compensation game and find an NE using a
suitable algorithm, under both EUT and PT, a fictitious play-based
algorithm is proposed in Table II. In this algorithm, the first stage
involves a simple initialization, in which each customer translates
its action, i.e., the reaching PF, into the Var compensating value.
Then, we propose an iterative process based on the fictitious play
algorithm [30] for solving the game in the second learning stage,
under both EUT and PT. Here, the customers will observe others
strategies at time m − 1 so as to update their next strategies
at time m. In this respect, the customers will update their
beliefs about each other’s strategies by monitoring their actions.
We let ai(m) be the action taken by player i at time m and
σaii (m), ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ N , be the empirical frequency, representing
the frequency that player i has chosen strategy/action ai until time
m. At any given iteration m, the following FP process is used by
a player i to update its beliefs:
σaii (m) =
m− 1
m
· σaii (m− 1) +
1
m
· 1{ai(m−1)=ai(m)}. (17)
The strategy chosen at time m is the one that maximizes the
expected utility with respect to the updated empirical frequencies.
This expected utility would follow (6) for EUT and (8) for PT.
Thus, player i can repeatedly choose its strategy as:
ai(m) = arg max
ai∈Ai
ui
(
ai,σ−i(m− 1)
)
, (18)
where the utility here is the expected value obtained by player i
with respect to the mixed strategy of its opponents, when player
i chooses pure strategy ai. If the chosen strategy ai(m) is not a
singleton, there exists at least one strategy, in which the utility
of the strategy is the maximum value in a certain iteration. In
particular, if there are more than one strategy that maximizes the
utility in (18), we will pick the smaller pure strategy, which makes
economic sense.
For some specific games, it is well known that FP is guaranteed
to converge to a mixed strategy NE [30], as the choosing
frequency of players’ beliefs converge to a fixed point. However,
to our knowledge, such a result has not been extended to PT, as
done in the following theorem:
Theorem 1: For the proposed reactive power compensation
game, the proposed FP-based algorithm is guaranteed to converge
to a mixed NE under both EUT and PT, if the choosing frequency
of players’ beliefs converges in the FP iterative process.
Proof:
The convergence of FP to a mixed strategy NE for EUT under
the convergence of choosing frequency is a known result as
discussed in [22] and [30]. For PT, if the choosing frequency
converges to a fixed point, this point will be a mixed strategy
NE. We prove this case using contradiction as follows.
Suppose that {σk} is a fictitious play process that will converge
to a fixed point, i.e., a mixed strategy σ∗, after m = n0
iterations. By contradiction, we start to assume that the point
σ∗ = {σ∗i ,σ∗−i} is not a mixed strategy NE. Then, 1) there must
exist a strategy σ′i(a′i) ∈ σ∗i , such that σi(ai) > 0, σi(ai) ∈ σ∗
(at least one mixed strategy of player i is not zero) and
uPTi
(
a′i,σ
∗
−i
)
> uPTi
(
ai,σ
∗
−i
)
, (19)
where ui(ai,σ∗−i) is the expected utility with respect to the mixed
strategies of the opponents of player i, when player i chooses
pure strategy ai. Here, we can choose a value ǫ that satisfies 2)
0 < ǫ < 12 |uPTi (a′i,σ∗−i) − uPTi (ai,σ∗−i)| as σ converges to σ∗
at iteration m = n0. Also, 3) since the FP process decreases as
the number of iterations n increases, the utility distance of a pure
strategy between two consecutive iterations must be less than ǫ
after a certain iteration n0. For n ≥ n0, the FP process can be
written as:
uPTi (ai,σ
n
−i) =
∑
a∈A
uPTi (ai,a
n
−i)σ
n
−i
≤
∑
a∈A
uPTi (ai,a
∗
−i)σ
∗
−i + ǫ
<
∑
a∈A
uPTi (a
′
i,a
∗
−i)σ
∗
−i − ǫ
≤
∑
a∈A
uPTi (a
′
i,a
n
−i)σ
n
−i
=uPTi (a
′
i,σ
n
−i).
(20)
In (20), we compute the expected utility of pure strategy ai
over the probabilities of all possible cases with respect to the
utilities. We obtained the first inequality between two consecutive
iterations as in 3). We obtained the second inequality using 1) and
2). Then, we obtained the third inequality like the first one, due
to 3). At last we obtained the expected utility of pure strategy a′i.
Thus, player i would not choose ai but would rather choose a′i
after the nth iteration, mathematically, we will have σi(ai) = 0.
Hence, we get σi(ai) = 0 which contradicts the initial assumption
that σi(ai) > 0; thus the theorem is shown.
Following the convergence to a mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium, the last stage in the algorithm of Table II is how
the customers compensate their reactive power in practice and
exchange Var between customers. The actual process of Stage 3
is beyond the scope of this paper and will follow economic and
real-world contract negotiations.
The algorithm in Table II shows how customers act in concert
with each other for the purpose of reactive power compensation.
Such process requires the power company to investigate cus-
tomers’ perception on compensation as captured by the rationality
parameters α, β and k in (11). Furthermore, the power company
wants to study the relationship between EUT and PT so as to
draft a contract with customers. Thus, we next find when the
EUT utility is exactly equal to PT result, i.e., the intersection
point between EUT and PT.
Theorem 2: For the proposed reactive power compensation
game, for every customer i, there exists a threshold k0, such that,
when ki < k0, UPTi (σPT∗) > UEUTi (σEUT∗), and when ki > k0,
UPTi (σ
PT∗) < UEUTi (σ
EUT∗).
Proof:
In the proposed game, the utility derivative on k can be
obtained by (6) and (8). The partial derivative of Ui with respect
to ki depends on the expected utility, while the partial derivative
of ui depends on the utility of a pure strategy. In (7), the pure PT
utility is divided as two cases by the reference point; in (8), the
expected PT utility can be also viewed as a summation of such
two cases. Using the PT utility uPTi of a certain pure strategy set in
(7), we can obtain the PT expected utility, as the NE configuration
defined in (8),
UPTi (σ) =
∑
a∈A
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i),
=
∑
a∈A,ui>u0i
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i)
+
∑
a∈A,ui=u0i
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i)
+
∑
a∈A,ui<u0i
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i)
=UPTi (σ) · 1ui>u0i + UPTi (σ) · 1ui<u0i .
Here, we can get
∑
a∈A,ui=u0i
(∏N
j=1 σj(aj)
)
uPTi (ai,a−i) =
0. In particular, as ui < u0i , uPTi can be differentiated by ki as
per (7). We note that, UPTi is a function at σ, u0i , αi, βi and ki.
In this respect, UPTi (σ) = UPTi (σ, ki). Thus, to obtain the partial
derivative of Ui in ki, we need to consider the partial derivative
of both cases in ki:
∂UEUTi (σ
∗)
∂ki
=0,
∂UPTi (σ
∗, ki)
∂ki
=
∂UPTi (σ
∗, ki) · 1ui>u0i
∂ki
+
∂UPTi (σ
∗, ki) · 1ui<u0i
∂ki
=0−
∑
a∈A,ui<u0i
( N∏
j=1
σj(aj)
)(
u0i (a
0)− ui(a)
)βi
<0.
(21)
Here, we note that 1) the partial derivative of Ui is the expected
utility while ui is the utility of a pure strategy; and 2) the utility of
customer i is a continuous function in ki while having the discrete
action ai. At a mixed NE σEUT∗, the objective utility will be a
constant value. For PT cases, we can obtain the expected utility
via σPT∗ and UPTi is a strictly decreasing function as ki increases.
Then, UPTi (σPT∗) and UEUTi (σEUT∗) will intersect at a point when
ki = k0. In particular, we can compute k0 at the intersected point
using the parameters (i.e., α, β, UEUTi , u0i ). Hence, when ki < k0,
UPTi (σ
PT∗) > UEUTi (σ
EUT∗), and when ki > k0, UPTi (σPT∗) <
UEUTi (σ
EUT∗). This conclusion implies that, a small (large) k will
increase the gain (loss) evaluation, and then increase (decrease)
the expected value under PT.
The PT framing effect is captured via three key parameters:
we have three factors, αi, βi and ki. Compared to αi and βi, the
partial derivative of Ui with respect to ki is more linear. Thus, it
is more practical for the power company to control local reactive
power compensation via ki instead of αi and βi. Thus, compared
to other factors, the linear property of the aversion parameter k
provides a useful approach for the power company to distinguish
customers’ perception within the proposed compensation game.
Theorem 2 analyzes the impact of the aversion parameter k
instead of the weighting factors α, β. This theorem investigates
the intersection between EUT and PT, and thus, it can be used
to compute when the customers’ utility is more/less than the
standard compensation. In particular, since the derivative of PT
utility on k is monotonic in (21), customers can have a linear
outcome regarding to their perception on compensation gains as
opposed to that on compensation losses.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we run extensive simulations for understanding
how customers’ behaviors impact the Var compensation coor-
dination under both EUT and PT game. For simulating the
proposed system, we consider a local area consisting of a number
of customers equipped with electrical devices to compensate
reactive power, i.e., switched capacitors, in which customers’
compensation coordination depends on their reaching PF in (3).
To obtain the mixed Nash equilibrium under both EUT and PT,
we use the proposed algorithm in Table II.
A. Two-customer Case
First, we start with the case of two customers. Here, we assume
that Customer 1 and Customer 2’s initial PF are, φ1 = 0.77, φ2 =
0.79, respectively, and their standard PFs are φ˜1 = φ˜2 = 0.85.
Also, we assume that the active power p1 = 2 kW, p2 = 3 kW
with a relative penalty factor τi = 0.7, ∀i. In particular, both
customers choose their strategy from a two-strategy set Ai =
{0.8, 0.9}, ∀i as the compensating PF, and their initial mixed
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Fig. 2. Customers’ mixed-strategies at the equilibrium for both EUT and PT with
αi = 0.7, βi = 0.6, ki = 2, ∀i.
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Fig. 3. The mixed strategy of playing each pure strategy for both customers as
the number of iterations increases.
strategy sets are σinit1 = [0.67 0.33]T and σinit2 = [0.2 0.8]T .
In general, if we neglect the impact of the power factor, a bigger
active power requirement will lead to a bigger Var payment. In the
subsequent simulations, we vary customers’ parameters, i.e., αi,
βi, ki and u0i , to gain insights on the proposed Var compensation
game under both EUT and PT considerations.
Fig. 2 shows the resulting mixed strategies at both the EUT
and PT equilibria reached via fictitious play. In this figure, we
choose αi = 0.7, βi = 0.6, ki = 2, ∀i, and the reference point
u0i (a
0) = u0i (φ˜1, φ˜2) for two PT customers. In particular, the
reference point is chosen to coincide with the case in which
customers compensate their reactive power with respect to a
standard PF φ˜1 = φ˜2 = 0.85 that is conveyed to customers by the
power company, such that, u01 = −0.0256, u02 = 0.0256 in (7).
From Fig. 2, we can first see that the mixed strategies of both
customers are different between PT and EUT. Under PT, both
customers are more likely to choose a high PF compensation
action, i.e., a1 = a2 = 0.9. When a customer chooses a low
(high) PF strategy, its reactive power compensation goes below
(exceeds) the standard PF compensation of the grid (φ˜ = 0.85).
Thus, under PT, customers evaluate their payoff based on the
observation of the standard PF compensation (i.e., u0i (a0)), and
this will make them avoid taking a low PF action. Indeed, since
αi > βi and ki > 1, ∀i, PT gains (losses) will decrease (increase)
in (7) and then, both customers tend to provide extra Var to the
grid, instead of risking prospective losses if they use a low PF
value. Also, from Fig. 2, we can see the difference in Customer
1’s strategies chosen in EUT versus PT is larger than that of
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Fig. 4. The Var expected utility under both PT and EUT as the loss distortion
parameter β varies.
Customer 2. In this case, Customer 2’s active power is larger than
Customer 1. Then, the framing effect on Customer 2 is smaller
than Customer 1, due to the concavity of gains (i.e., using the
large strategy) and the convexity of losses (i.e, using the small
strategy) in (7). Thus, Customer 2’s EUT strategy would lightly
increase via PT considerations.
In Fig. 3, we show the values of the PT mixed strategies of both
customers (corresponding to Fig. 2), as the number of iterations
increases. Here, the proposed algorithm in (17) clearly converges
to a mixed NE. The mixed strategy increases to its maximum
quickly during the first iteration in (17) and then it decreases
as the number of iterations increases. The convergence criterion
here is that the difference between two consecutive iterations is
small enough in the proposed two-customer game. From Fig. 3,
the difference between the last two iterations is less than 10−4
in 1 sec (real time, by using a machine with a 2.2GHz processor
and 3GB RAM). In practice, the company can set a suitable stop
criterion for balancing the required communication delay and the
convergence time of reactive power compensation.
In Fig. 4, we study the costs of compensating reactive power
in kVar as the loss distortion parameter β1 = β2 = β increases.
In order to singly observe the impact of the loss distortion, we
hold α1 = α2 = 1, k1 = k2 = 1 to cancel the gain distortion
and aversion effect in (7). Also, we assume u0i = 0, i = {1, 2} to
neglect the impact of reference point. Here the expected utility
for both customers is the costs/payment of Var compensation,
which is a negative value in (2). In this figure, we can see that
the expected utility increases as β increases, implying that large β
decreases PT costs in Var compensation. A small β increases the
PT loss and, for the proposed prospect model, PT customers will
have much cost if they increasingly evaluate PT losing distortion
in (2). In particular, when β = 1, the PT utility is equal to the
EUT utility. From this figure, we can also see that a same losing
parameter β leads to different impacts on customers. For example,
Customer 2’s difference between PT and EUT is greater than 0.6
while that of Customer 1 is less than 0.6, when β = 0.1. This is
because Customer 2 requires more active power than Customer
1.
Fig. 5 shows the expected Var value under both EUT and
PT as the reference point u0 varies. For this scenario, we
maintain α1 = α2 = 1, k1 = k2 = 1 to eliminate the impact
of gain distortion. Also, we assume both customers have an
equal reference and a same loss distortion, i.e., u01 = u02 and
β1 = β2. First, we can see that the expected Var cost will increase
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Fig. 5. The Var expected utility under PT and EUT as the reference point u0
varies.
as the reference increases. Because the reference point in (7)
is subtracted from the EUT utility, customer evaluation would
depend on a referent level. In essence, a large (active) power
requirement leads to more payments in practice, compared to the
EUT case. Also, Fig. 5 shows that the distortion parameter β will
have different impacts on the PT utility as well as the references
u0. For example, when the reference is a small value, i.e., u0 = 0,
the cost difference between β = 1 and β = 0.6 is around 0.2,
while the difference is less than 0.1 as u0 = 0.5. This shows how
the distortion parameter impacts the PT utility, which incorporates
both the reference and EUT utility in (7).
B. System with More than Three Customers
In Fig. 6, we show all mixed strategies in a three-customer
game. We choose α = 0.7, β = 0.6, k = 2, ∀i and Ai =
{0.8, 0.82, 0.84, 0.86, 0.88, 0.9} for all customers, in which the
PT reference point is u0i (a0) = u0i (φ˜1, φ˜2, φ˜3) and standard
PF is 0.85. In particular, the active power requirement vector
and the initial PF are randomly chosen, respectively, as p =
[2.4 4.1 3]T and φ = [0.77 0.78 0.77]T . Here, we can see
that the PT mixed strategies are different from EUT results.
Accounting for the PT framing effect in (7), the reference point
u0 = [−0.1241 0.1229 0.0012]T and the distortion parameters
allow customers to evaluate more on the losses (β, k) than the
gains (α). Thus, all customers would want to increase their high
PF strategy due to the fact that they observe a prospective losing
tendency in practice. Moreover, compared to Fig. 2, we can see
that the framing effect in (7) can change a pure strategy under
PT to a more mixed strategy, even change the pure strategy to
another pure strategy.
Using the same parameters as in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 shows the total
utility of all customers for the proposed multi-customer game, as
the aversion parameter k1 = k2 = k varies. In this figure, we
can first see that PT utility decreases as k increases. In (7), the
aversion parameter k can capture customers’ perception on eval-
uation, i.e., gains and losses in practice. This result corresponds
to Theorem 2, such that if customers increase evaluation on the
gains compared to losses (i.e., k < 1), their total PT utility will
be greater than that of EUT, and vice versa. Indeed, we can see
that EUT and PT utilities intersect at a point, i.e., k = 1.04. The
intersection point is not exactly equal to 1 due to the fact that the
gain distortion parameter α is greater than β which implies that
customers have a smaller gaining distortion than losing distortion.
Thus, there needs to be a high aversion parameter (i.e., k > 1) to
balance the distortion difference between gain and loss. Second,
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compared the EUT and PT results, we show the total utility under
optimization (green line). The optimization solution is the total
maximum utility of a pure strategy, while EUT and PT show
the expected utility over all strategies. From this figure, we can
see that the performance of EUT is always less below that of the
centralized optimization approach when the power company seeks
to maximize the total utility. Although the total optimal utility is
greater than the result under EUT or PT, the optimal solution
cannot capture customer behavior due to their independence.
Thus, we can use to counter the customers’ behaviors and design
a decentralized, customer-aware optimal solution for reactive
power compensation. Last, this figure shows how reactive power
will be compensated via zonal/local customers’ coordination. For
example, compared to the other distortion parameters (i.e., α, β)
that were evaluated in Fig. 4, we can see a more linear curve as
the aversion parameter k varies in Fig. 7. For example, to collect
the PT behavior, the power company needs to investigate how a
PT customer may frame its objective gains via α, and how this
customer may frame its objective loss via β. In this case, the
power company needs to find two types of information. For the
aversion parameter k, the power company can directly collect the
information how a customer views the PT gains as oppose to the
PT losses. This implies that, reactive power compensation can be
coordinated via the customers’ perception of operational gains as
opposed to losses, thus reducing the amount of collected data.
Table III shows all mixed strategies of a system with 7
customers under both EUT and PT. In this case, we assume
that the active power of all customer is 2.4kW with a three-
TABLE III
ALL MIXED NE STRATEGY OF 7 CUSTOMERS UNDER BOTH EUT AND PT,
(τi = 67 ,∀i)
EUT PT
1 [0.620 0.374 0.006]T [0.333 0.666 0.001]T
2 [0.633 0.363 0.005]T [0.313 0.687 0.001]T
3 [0.454 0.544 0.002]T [0.319 0.680 0.001]T
4 [0.481 0.517 0.003]T [0.286 0.714 0.001]T
5 [0.461 0.538 0.001]T [0.319 0.685 0.002]T
6 [0.514 0.482 0.005]T [0.289 0.709 0.002]T
7 [0.529 0.468 0.003]T [0.303 0.696 0.001]T
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Fig. 8. The average utility at the equilibrium for both EUT and PT as N increases.
strategy set, i.e., pi = 2.4,Ai = {0.86, 0.87, 0.88}, ∀i. Their
standard PFs and initial mixed strategy sets are φ˜i = 0.85,σiniti =
[0.33 0.33 0.33]T , ∀i, respectively. In line with Corollary 2, we
first set τi = 0.5. Since τi = 0.5 < 67 , all customers’ probabilities
on the maximum (pure) strategy are around 1 and, all customers
will choose 0.88 as their pure compensation strategy under both
EUT and PT. Similarly, when τi = 0.9 > 67 , all customers
will choose 0.86 as their compensation pure strategy because all
customers’ probabilities on the minimum (pure) strategy approach
to 1 under both EUT and PT. Furthermore, to study the difference
between EUT and PT, we set τi = 67 so as to guarantee a
more “mixed” case. In Table III, the mixed strategies of all PT
customers are not the same as the EUT strategies. The difference
between EUT and PT mainly pertains to their initial strategies
(i.e., φ1 = 0.79, φ5 = 0.77) and their participating order in the
compensation game (i.e., we use a sequential algorithm in (17).
Last but not least, as the number of customers increases, the
complexity of finding an NE via FP can increase. For example, a
game with each customer having 3 strategy will have 37 = 2187
combinations. Increasing the number of customer to 10 will have
69049 combinations, which can be too complex to solve. To solve
games with number of customers, we can divide the system into
multiple, smaller areas and then, within each area applying the
proposed scheme to obtain an “area” NE. The “area” NE can be
considered as a player in a large number of customer game.
In Fig. 8, we can see that the average utility decreases as
the number of customers varies. By assuming pi = 2.4, φ˜i =
0.85, σiniti = 1/N,Ai = {0.86, 0.87}, ∀i, an increasing number
of customers will lead to more interactions as we assume the
benefit of Var exchange refers to all customers in (4). Under the
strategy set Ai = {0.86, 0.87}, the cost of each customer (i.e.,
τi(q
c
i − q˜ci )+) in (5) is constant. For a small system (N ≤ 3), the
customers might have significantly larger benefits to share than in
the four-customer case. When N ≥ 4, the benefits shared by all
customers might decrease while the cost of each customer remains
constant. Then, for the proposed model, thus, the shared benefits
rely on both the number of customers and their initial active power
and, the shared benefits will not always be decreasing. Thus, due
to the difference of customers’ initial points, at N = 3, the utility
curve has a non-monotonic.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel game-theoretic
approach for modeling the reactive power compensation between
local customers via Var coordination. We have formulated the
Var compensation process as a noncooperative game between
customers, in which customers have subjective perception on their
economic losses and gains. Using the framework of prospect
theory, we have modeled such perceptions and analyzed their
impact on the system. To solve the proposed game, we have pro-
posed a fictitious play-based algorithm that is shown to converge
to an equilibrium point under a PT scenario. Simulation results
have shown that the use of prospect-theoretic considerations can
provide insightful information on the behaviors of customers
engaged in reactive power compensation.
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